Neringa Venckiene v. United States

A. In Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502 (1896), the Court addressed the so-called “political offense” exception to extradition, relating the phrase to actions committed at or about a time revolutionary activity was in progress. Since then, lower courts have limited the exception to war-like insurrections. Given the present state of international turmoil, which includes acts of terrorism and violence on every possible scale, the Court needs to provide a modern working definition of the phrase and the principles necessary to apply the political offense doctrine to the realities of today’s world. The question presented therefore asks whether the Seventh Circuit has correctly construed the “political offense” exception to extradition by limiting the term only to offenses committed in the midst of war-like violent insurrections. B. Prior Seventh Circuit precedent permitted the District Court deny an extradition request where “exceptional constitutional limitations as may exist because of particularly atrocious procedures or punishments employed by the foreign jurisdiction.” See In re Burt, 737 F.2d 1477, 1487 (7th Cir. 1984). The panel in the instant case noted that Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008), cast doubt “on the continuing validity or at least the scope of Burt’s constitutional and humanitarian limitations.” The panel avoided deciding the issue by assuming Burt’s continuing validity but ruling that petitioner failed to show specific atrocious procedures or punishments that would justify denying extradition anyway. The question for review asks whether Munaf v. Green overruled the