TKC Aerospace Inc. v. Charles Taylor Muhs

Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), a debt may not be discharged in bankruptcy if it arises from a “willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another.” In Kawaahua v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61-64 (1998), this Court held that this exception to discharge only applies when the debtor acted with “the actual intent to cause injury” (emphasis added). Since Geiger, this Court has offered no further guidance on the evidence needed to meet this “actual intent” requirement. Interpreting Geiger, nearly all circuits considering this issue have held that a debtor’s actions qualify as causing a “willful and malicious” injury where he or she acted with (1) actual, subjective intent to cause injury, or (2) “substantial certainty” that injury would result from the debtor’s conduct. However, circuits are split over whether this “substantial certainty” prong requires proof of the debtor’s subjective belief that injury was certain or whether proof of the objective certainty that an injury would result from the debtor’s acts satisfies the intent requirement. At last count, three circuits—the Fifth, the Seventh, and the Fourth (in an opinion predating the opinion below in this case) have held that proof of objective certainty is sufficient. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits disagree with that approach. The question presented is: Whether a debtor’s conduct qualifies as causing a “willful and malicious” injury under Section 523(a)(6) when the debtor’s acts were objectively certain to result in the injury giving rise to the debt.