Bruce C. Rosetto, et al. v. Charles Murphy, et al.

In the late 1800’s, this Court issued Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126 (1881), holding that courtappointed receivers and their agents can only be sued in civil court if the alleged misconduct conduct is “ultra vires,” i.e., outside the scope designated authority. 104 U.S. at 134. Otherwise, the plaintiff needs to first obtain permission by the court that appointed the receiver to bring the civil lawsuit. 104 U.S. at 27. This Court has not since revisited how ultra vires misconduct under the archaic Barton doctrine applies to our modern-day pleading standards. Specifically, in deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a trial court is prohibited from weighing or resolving disputed facts where the merits of the case are intertwined with the jurisdictional question. Yet in a case involving alleged misconduct by a court-appointed receiver or its agents, whether the conduct is ultra vires under the Barton doctrine is necessarily intertwined with the merits of the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional question. This Court’s 19th Century Barton decision does not contemplate this contemporary problem. The question presented to this Court is: Where a plaintiff alleges that an agent of a courtappointed receiver is liable for misconduct committed outside the scope of designated authority, but where the agent of the receiver moves to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) citing the Barton doctrine and the purported need to obtain pre-filing permission from the court that appointed the receiver, is the trial court