Charles J. Weiss v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

26 U.S.C. § 6330, enacted as part of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights III (1998), requires that IRS send to all taxpayers written notice at least 30 days before taking any levy action. The purpose of the notice is to afford all taxpayers at least 30 days in which to request an appeals hearing, which timely request will stay the levy and provide judicial appeal rights. Petitioner received such a notice. The notice twice informed him that he had “30 days from the date of this letter” in which to request an appeal. (Emphasis supplied.) The IRS, however, used a different date, the mailing date, that was not given to Petitioner, when calculating that 30-day period. The question presented is: under the notice prong of the Fifth Amendment due process clause and the statute itself, whether the IRS notice means what it says – as the 3rd, 9th, and 11th Circuits recognized and the D.C. Circuit previously agreed – that the 30 days runs from “the date of this letter,” or whether it means what the D.C. Circuit held in this case: that the 30 days runs from the date of IRS’ mailing of the letter, a date undisclosed to and unknown by Petitioner