Kohn Law Group, Inc. v. Auto Parts Manufacturing Mississippi, Inc.

What is the standard for judging allegations of civil contempt of an injunction or other disputed order, as distinct from a consent decree? Is it the same “four corners” standard that governs a claim of contempt for allegedly violating a consent decree – as the First and Second Circuits both have held, and the Fourth and Seventh Circuits essentially agree? See United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682 (1971). Or, is the Fifth Circuit correct in holding that a district court is entitled to “flexibility” when interpreting “reasonably understood terms” that are not expressed in the actual terms of the order itself, to vindicate the unexpressed purposes of the same judge who rendered the order? This Court has never squarely extended Armour to non-consent orders or explicitly overruled the holding in McComb v. Jackonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187 (1949), that “[i]t does not lie in their mouths to say that they have an immunity from civil contempt because the plan or scheme which they adopted was not specifically enjoined.” Id. at 192. The Federal Circuit, en banc, has held McComb remains binding.

What is the standard of appellate review of a district court’s interpretation of its own non-consent order when imposing civil contempt sanctions? The Fifth Circuit here performed an “abuse of discretion” review of the applicability of an interpleader discharge and injunction order to the undisputed conduct of the alleged contemnor. Pet. App. 2-3. Other Fifth Circuit decisions, as well as decisions in the Second, Ninth and Federal Circuits, have called this “a question of law” to be reviewed “de novo.”