Brittan Holland, et al. v. Kelly Rosen, et al.

Since before the Framing, monetary bail has been the primary mechanism for securing the presumptively innocent’s “right to freedom before conviction” while assuring “that he will stand trial.” Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951). “Bail set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is ‘excessive’ under the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 5. Because of that key protection, “liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial … is the carefully limited exception.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). In 2017, New Jersey made monetary bail unavailable to virtually all accused. The new law prohibits courts from even considering the possibility of monetary bail unless no combination of nonmonetary conditions—up to and including house arrest and 24-hour electronic monitoring—will reasonably assure the accused’s appearance. Thus, New Jersey precludes a court from offering monetary bail even when it (either alone or in combination with non-monetary conditions) is an equally effective but less intrusive means of ensuring appearance relative to a draconian non-monetary condition, like house arrest. In so doing, the law forces courts to needlessly restrict the pretrial liberty of the accused. The question presented is: Whether New Jersey, which authorizes monetary bail, but affirmatively requires courts to exhaust more restrictive non-monetary conditions before even considering monetary bail, unnecessarily restricts pretrial liberty in violation of the Eighth Amendment, Due Process Clause, or Fourth Amendment.