Joe Ribakoff v. City of Long Beach, California, et al.

The questions presented in this matter are: 1)Is a rule abridging speech by members of the public at an open public meeting of a city government a presumptively unconstitutional content-based speech regulation under the 15t Amendment if it does not also apply to 'staff' and government invite speakers when the justification for distinction between public and non-public speakers is that 'staff' and invite speakers are experts, while public speakers just create "the potential for endless discussion" [Appendix , pages 38-391 i.e. that the public - speaker's "speech is not worth it" United States v. Stevens 559 US 460, (2010)? 2) Does a state court have the power to cure a facially unconstitutional speech regulation of its 1st Amendment infirmities by rewriting it to constitutional standards, or, do separation of powers the constitutional order that - requires the legislature to legislate and the judiciary to adjudicate bar not just the federal court from rewriting - such a law (Stevens 559 US at), but also the state courts. Ask alternatively, can a state court make a facially unconstitutional state law into a facially constitutional one without ever changing the statute's face?