George Bellevue v. Universal Health Services of Hartgrove, Inc., dba Hartgrove Hospital

The False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3730(e)(4)(A), directs a court to dismiss an action if substantially the same allegations or transactions were publicly disclosed – unless the person bringing the action is an original source. An “original source” “means a person who has knowledge that is independent of and materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions, and who has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing an action.” Circuit Courts are split on the interpretation of the “materially adds” provision of the original source exception to the False Claims Act’s public disclosure bar. The First and Third Circuits, on the one hand, have concluded that “materially adds” must be distinct or the original source exception would be meaningless. On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit in Petitioner Bellevue’s case, and in Cause of Action v. Chicago Transit Authority, 815 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 2016), held that “because the plaintiff’s allegations were ‘substantially similar to’ the publicly disclosed allegations, the plaintiff did not ‘materially add’ to the public disclosure and could not be an original source.” Bellevue v. Universal Health Servs. of Hartgrove, Inc., 867 F.3d 712, 721 (7th Cir. 2017)(quoting Cause of Action, 815 F.3d at 283. Essentially the Seventh Circuit decision has established that a plaintiff can never be an original source if the complaint is substantially similar to the publicly disclosed allegations. The question presented addresses the proper interpretation of the “materially adds” provision of the False Claims Act’s original source exception to the public disclosure bar.