Angela V. Woodhull v. Shirley Mascarella, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Louise A. Falvo, et al.

This petition for writ of certiorari challenges a number of court-created obstacles to access to federal judicial process that appear to conflict with various provisions of the Constitution of the United States and federal statute. One, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, was established by this Court as a statutory interpretation of a long-repealed subsection of 28 U.S.C. §1257. Petitioner challenges it in four respects, including that the doctrine has not actually existed since its repeal in 1988 and that its continued invocation violates another, fundamental doctrine: the separation of powers, here under Article III, sections 1 and 2. Others are firm practices of the two federal court benches below, established internally and not publicly announced (nor denied). Another, addressed in Question 2, is the district court's novel interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(2) and (c)—adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit via generic (and only generic) repetition—categorically barring the filing of a federal lawsuit if the plaintiff knows of a potential jurisdictional challenge or affirmative defense, expressly equating that knowledge with per se unreasonableness and thus frivolousness. Neither court identified, much less addressed, the specific claims and legal arguments, nor the factual claims upon which the legal arguments were based: e.g., the repeal of the statute that District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman interpreted; that Feldman itself allowed the respondents/plaintiffs to challenge the constitutionality of the District of Columbia law at issue; the holding in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. in relation to the timing of the filing of this litigation. QUESTION 1 a. Given that Feldman was entirely a statutoryinterpretation opinion interpreting a subsection of 28