Karen Fujita v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

First impression: 26 U.S.C. § 83 explains how to tax all employee and non-employee compensation in America.' This court has never decided a case involving this provision as applied to typical fees, wages, salaries, commissions, or self-employment earnings. Petitioner would have been penalized in Tax court for seeking an explanation of this provision with respect to her liability, and thus first raised this provision before the Ninth circuit, and now before this court. Are the interests of justice best served by this court's taking up of the core issues rejected below, as a Hormel exception to procedural bars or prudential rules? (See Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552 (1941)). Did the lower court err in declining to hear the 26 U.S.C. § 83 issues thus effectively holding - that Tax court's imposition of severe monetary penalties for making arguments deemed "frivolous," without prior notice or otherwise, is not a miscarriage of justice, fundamental error, or an abuse of discretion? (See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134-36 (1992)). Are monetary sanctions under 26 U.S.C. § 6673 unconstitutional as imposed on purely legal arguments to Tax Court, and on Petitioner's rights to free speech, to redress, and to due process under the First and Fifth Amendments?2 1 See Montelepre Systemed, Inc. v. C.I.R., 956 F.2d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 1992); Gudrnundsson v. U.S., 634 F.3d 212 (2d Cir. 2011). Does Petitioner have a constitutional right to be right or wrong 2 i.e., about a provision of law fOund in 26 U.S.C. and its regulations?