Richard Storer, et al. v. Jeremy Clark, et al.

For almost two centuries, the Nation’s patent laws have established two options for aggrieved parties to challenge agency determinations in priority-ofinvention disputes between competing inventors— district-court civil actions allowing for civil process and additional evidence (followed by appellate-court review), see 35 U.S.C. § 146, or immediate appellate review of the agency action, see 35 U.S.C. § 141. The Federal Circuit, however, has interpreted the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011 (and its technical amendments) as having impliedly repealed by negative inference § 146 district-court subjectmatter jurisdiction, and limiting Article III jurisdiction unto itself under § 141, for such “interference” proceedings declared after September 15, 2012. In so ruling, the Federal Circuit has never even attempted to reconcile its decision with this Court’s rulings holding that “jurisdiction is not defeated by implication.” Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 223 U.S. 481, 490 (1912). The question presented is: In the America Invents Act, did Congress impliedly repeal the almost-200-year-old statutory grant of district-court subject-matter jurisdiction, currently codified in 35 U.S.C. § 146, in favor of exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit?