Vicente Quiroz v. United States

To prove an arrestee waived his privilege against self-incrimination, the government must show waiver was made “knowingly and intelligently.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). This Court has provided guidance on the type and degree of evidence sufficient to show waiver was both knowing and intelligent when an arrestee affirmatively declares that he understands his rights, or, at a minimum, acknowledges the officer’s warnings. See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 726-727 (1979) (defendant stated that he understood his rights); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (same); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 371 (1979) (same); Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 385-86 (2010) (noting there was sufficient evidence defendant understood his rights when there was “no contention that [defendant] did not understand his rights” and defendant “received a written copy of the Miranda warnings”). However, when an arrestee does not affirm his understanding, or, as here, where the arrestee does not acknowledge the officer’s warnings at all, lower courts lack direction. As a result, courts have turned to divergent, often contradictory factors to determine whether waiver was made knowingly and intelligently in such situations. The question presented is: When a defendant does not acknowledge an arresting officer’s recitation of the Miranda warnings, what must the prosecution show to overcome the presumption that the defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive his rights?