Scott David Perreault v. Anthony Stewart, Warden

In Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994), this Court held that when a suspect invokes his right to counsel, “he must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.” This Court has explained that the “requirement of an unambiguous invocation of Miranda rights results in an objective inquiry that ‘avoid[s] difficulties of proof and * * * provide[s] guidance to officers’ on how to proceed in the face of ambiguity.” Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381 (2010) (alterations and omission in original) (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 458-459). Despite this Court’s clear directive, division has emerged as to whether the analysis of a suspect’s invocation of his right to counsel should focus on the plain meaning of a suspect’s words or whether it permits courts to examine a suspect’s subjective intent, as the court below and some state high courts have done. When a suspect says during a custodial interrogation, “Well, then let’s call the lawyer then ’cause I gave what I could,” does a state court unreasonably apply Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and its progeny in concluding that a suspect’s words were “akin to negotiations,” and thus not an unequivocal invocation of his right to counsel? (I)